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CAN ANY RIGHT OF DIRECT CITATION BE
GIVEN TO A STATE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFLICTS?
By direct action we must understand the power of an injured
party to make its appeal personally to competent jurisdiction, with-
out being obliged to seek either the intervention of a constituted
authority or a preliminary authorization, or even an understanding
with its adversary.
In private law the general rule is that there is, for every indi-
vidual, free access to the courts. It is only in exceptional cases,
and because of considerations of public peace, that certain suits are
subordinated to the consent of the government or reserved to its
initiative.
In international law, on the other hand, the possibility has never
been conceived, up to now, of a judgment of court except after an
agreement by which all the parties in litigation have agreed to accept
this procedure. Since the idea of arbitration preceded and still
dominates the idea of justice in the minds of the best theorists, they
are constrained by a knowledge, slightly too technical, of the princi-
ples which rule the verbal process of compromise. Article ioo6 of the
French Code of Civil Procedure provides in this respect that "the
compromise shall designate the points in litigation and the names of
the arbitrators, on penalty of being null and void." This rule is well
understood in the case of private law, and it is its transposition into
international law which allows some criticism. Since there exist
for individuals tribunals of common law with recognized plenary
jurisdiction, it is natural if not to suspect, at least to consider as
abnormal, the attitude of those parties in the suit who agree to
carry before a third party a litigation, the cognizance of which
ought to appertain to the established power, and it is natu-al, also,
not to treat this agreement as a regular course of procedure unless
the agreement and wishes of the parties are really manifested in the
conditions demanded by Article ioo6, cited above, or by similar pro-
visions which exist in other systems of legislation.
But when it is sought to adapt this principle to international law
it must be reasoned out by a slightly stricter method. There must
be one of two situations. Either it is planned to make the court
established at the Hague a regular and permanent jurisdiction, and
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then it must base its procedure upon the rules of the common law
and not upon the exceptional rules of particular cases of arbitration;
or one must be content in the future as in the past, with the purely
arbitrary procedure, in which case it was superfluous to create an
authoritative and perpetual organism. Before I899, this inconsis-
tency did not exist. There was no international body designed to
separate the states, and formerly it was perfectly evident that no
arbitration could be produced unless the parties had first placed
themselves in accord upon the object of the litigation and upon the
choice of their judges. But as soon as the regular court is estab-
lished, this court should be a tribunal in the strictest acceptation of
the term and access to it should be open to everybody interested.
We can explain, then, only with great difficulty, Article 31 of the
first Hague Convention, No. 52 of the Convention of i9o7, which
appoints that the powers which resort to arbitration shall sign
a special agreement in which are clearly set out the causes of
the litigation, as well as the extent of the powers of the arbitrators
etc. It is, then, impossible for a state to summon or even
to drag its adversary before the established jurisdiction, if the adver-
sary is unwilling to follow voluntarily, and if it has not consented to
sign for this purpose a preliminary agreement. Nevertheless, the
Conference of i899 should be congratulated in that it rejected
upon the urgency of M. Asser a supplementary rule contained in
Article 2 of the advance project as issued by Russia, which would
have provided that all matters of fact and of law implicated in the
litigation submitted to the arbitrators should be specified as a pre-
liminary agreement. If this condition had been insisted upon, it
would have become almost impossible for states, whose relations
had become seriously strained, to succeed in agreeing, by the mere
result of a diplomatic negotiation, upon the terms of an agreement
so minute; and one would have given a very true argument to the
skepticism of those who contend that arbitration cannot result be-
tween any except those who have decided in advance to reach an
agreement. That is precisely what happened when the Madeira.
affair arose. The Portuguese government proposed to appeal to the
arbitration of the Hague Tribunal and the German government
opposed such a settlement. That is good pr6of of the inefficacy of
a preliminary agreement.
Such inconvenience cannot be avoided except by allowing a
state always to cite directly its adversary before the Hague Tribunal
and to demand against the latter a judgment by default if it does not
present itself. The progress of law has tended, from the very
beginning, to make it possible for the courts to decide in the absence
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of a party as practically and as equitably as in his presence, and
private law has not escaped the successive phases of this evolution
which will be imposed upon public law. Roman History shows
that in the early times the personal appearance of the parties was
indispensable to give the magistrate power to settle their difficul-
ties. When the plaintiff was not able to make his adversary answer
the summons, he took him by the throat and carried him to court
by force, "obtorto collo," as the books say. Then, since no violence
could be committed in the enclosure of justice, he let go his hold
and apostrophized the defendant in these terms, "Quod t e forte
invenio." And it was only in this way that the case could be liti-
gated. To-day civil procedure is happily freed from the necessity
of such a clumsy subterfuge. It has been long admitted not only
that the parties can be brought together by mandate, but that, in the
absence of an appearance, competent jurisdiction is validly taken
by a process of summoning, specifying the matter in suit and con-
taining an adjournment for the defendant up to the expiration of
the time set by law. Let international procedure accomplish the
same progress and let a diplomatic summons alone allow the plain-
tiff to supply a hearing to his adversary before the Hague Tribunal,
whose jurisdiction will rise by this single act.
This proposal runs the risk of meeting an objection in theory
from those who will make it a point to suggest that no one of the
authors who have treated up to this time the question of interna-
tional arbitration, has foreseen the possibility of litigating an inter-
national case otherwise than by a preliminary compromise
between the parties. Not only MM. Kamarowski,
1 Goldschmidt;2
Bluntschli,3 M6rignhac,4  Michel Revon,5 Ferdinand Dreyfus,8
and many others have proposed no enlargement of the tradi-
tional procedure in this respect, but even Mr. Dudley Field,
the best author of a project for international codification,1 has
sanctioned the old errors. The excuse for all these authors is that
their works were all prior to the first Hague Conference, and that,
while no permanent Tribunal existed, and while it was necessary in
each case to have recourse to arbitrators for that case alone, necessity
x. Le Tribunal International, pp. 502, seq.
2. Revue de Droit International, 1874-75, p. 227.
3. Droit International codifid, Art. 402, bis.
4. Trait thlorique et firatique de Z Arbitrage International, pp. 502
seq.
5. L'Arbitrage International, p. 518.
6. L'Arbitrage International, p. 295.
7. A High Tribunal of Arbitration, Art. 534, 535.
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demanded a preliminary compromise before any judicial action
could be taken. To-day the situation has changed and the system
of introducing cases should be applied with better results. In a
more enlightened age there should be a procedure correspondingly
more perfect. That is why we adopt very gladly the resolution
which was taken first at Lisle by the Third National Congress of
French Societies of Peace in April, 1905, upon the suggestion of M.
Lucien LeFoyer. This resolution is worded thus :"
"Since the Congress believes that arbitration cannot be actu-
ally obligatory unless the general agreement made by the contracting
powers results in an effective arbitration in all those individual diffi-
culties which cannot be settled by amicable means, we suggest
that the Second Hague Conference constitute the right of summon-
ing one power by another, that it rule the procedure by the system
of default and that it originate a common organization, acting spon-
taneously in cases which are marked out, in the name and in the
interest of what the first Hague Convention called the "Society of
Civilized Nations."
Supposing that this law of direct citation, so sanctioned by the
vote of a national congress, be admitted in principle, its execution
will evidently carry with it some difficulties as is the case in the
application of all the best reforms. But none of these difficulties
will be insurmountable.
First, it is to be feared just as the resolution above quoted fore-
saw, that the right of direct citation often can end only in a judg-
ment by default. This would be unfortunate, but is nevertheless
not to be avoided. A nation suspected of not being willing to sub-
ject itself to an agreement for arbitration will subject itself still
less to arbitration itself, and, entrenching itself behind the fiction
of its sovereignty, it will sometimes brave the decision which inter-
feres with it, rather than provide for it by the means of regular
opposition. It is then that means of execution will be inevitable.
Refusal by a state to answer the summons of its adversary will be so
much the more regrettable in that the duty of the judge in interna-
tional law, as well as in internal law, is not only to decide, but also to
conciliate, and conciliation is only possible when all parties are pres-
ent. Such a nation stands the chance then, by the existence of a pro-
cedure by default, of finding itself judged, when, by appearing vol-
untarily, it might have heard the arguments of its adversary, have
recognized all or part of its wrong-doings, have heard the counsel
of the Tribunal and have submitted, perhaps, to a settlement satis-
8. See Rev'ue de la Paix, May-June No., igos, p. 173.
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factory to its pride, as well as to its material interests. In place of
this, obstinacy on the part of the defendant leaves it no choice except
between shameful submission or armed resistance. This is all true,
but the force, even, of these objections, has the result of hurting
the party summoned, who has, more than anybody, an interest in
hindering such results. It is this party, in fine, which should find it
of the greatest advantage to have a good arrangement rather than
disadvantageous trial, and to try conciliation before the rendition
of judgment. It is preferable that its arguments, its evidence and its
rights, instead of remaining hidden beneath the veil of its silence,
or behind its obstinacy, should be loudly proclaimed, pressed, sus-
tained and defended at the bar of the International Tribunal. When
one has good reasons, one is always ready to show them, and if one
avoids discussion, he is easily convinced that everybody will consider
him in the wrong. Besides, is it not certain that the parties sum-
moned, far from avoiding discussion, will be desirous, in most cases,
of pleading and of throwing out to the whole world the cry, more
or less personal, of its ambitions and of its sincerity? Allowing
default may be the attitude of those sovereigns who feel that their
cause is lost in advance, not only in the minds of the jurists, but
also from the standpoint of public opinion; one can imagine easily
enough that the Sultan would default rather than render an account
of the Armenian massacre, and the Czar would have had, perhaps,
the same hesitation in replying to a summons by Finland. But then,
in cases of this nature, where there is a true unanimity of opinion
throughout the world, is it not evident that the pressure of the uni-
versal conscience in favor of a judgment by default will be so power-
ful that it will be impossible for the party condemned, even by its
arms, to brave this moral opposition? The sentence would certainly
be executed and then international arbitration would have consum-
mated its greatest triumph and proven its entire efficacy, since it
would have broken, by the sole power of law, the most obstinate
resistance, or the most unconquerable inertia. We see, then, that
the principal inconvenience of the right of direct citation will neu-
tralize and eliminate itself.
The exercise of a direct citation will demand an additional rule
in order to determine what the composition of the arbitration com-
mission shall be. In the case of the first Hague Convention, the arbi-
trators were designated -by a common agreement of the parties acting
in the preliminary agreement.9 As soon as there is a direct citation
without preliminary agreement, one cannot see immediately who will
9. Art. 32; now Art. 55 (I9o7).
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do the judging, unless the permanent court proposed, but not yet
voted for .by the second Hague Conference, be finally admitted, in
which case, according to Articles 17, i8 and i9 of the proposal, such
a court might be always competent. If not it is evident
that while the act of summoning will make the whole court take
jurisdiction, it cannot be expected that all the members of this
court can be compelled to participate in the judgment, and since,
on the other hand, the selection by agreement remains impossible
if the party prosecuted allows default, we are reduced to the one
solution of selecting by lot the arbitrators of the case. This selec-
tion would be made by the permanent bureau, which will serve on
record at the Court of the Hague. It may be noticed that the Con-
vention of i9o7 already admits the selection by lot of the
Umpire (Article 45 in fine, and Article 87). The solution would
have, moreover, some advantages, notably that of protecting the
arbitrators against the suspicion of partiality which always falls
upon arbitrators chosen by the parties themselves. It is plain that
in this case the arbitrators of both parties should be drawn by
lot, and that the state prosecuting should not be able to take advan-
tage of its initiative by having arbitrators of its choice, whose decis-
ion would have still less authority against the state which was being
sued. Nevertheless, the defendant could be allowed after an attempt
had been made to persuade it to present itself even tardily, and make
its voluntary appearance in the time between the summons and the
judgment-or even after the default had been pronounced, in the
interval between judgment by default and the time allowed for pro-
test-which should re-establish for both parties the means to choose
their arbitrators after the common law of Article 32, now Article 55,
(i9o7). A remarkable advance towards such a state of inter-
national law has been made in i9o7 by the new Articles, 48, Section
3, and 53 of the second Hague Convention. These articles provide
that any state may directly send over to the international bureau
at the Hague a declaration stating that it is willing to submit its case
to arbitration, and the bureau is then obliged to give immediate
knowledge of this declaration to the other power. The necessity of
a special agreement is not avoided, but the agreement, instead of
being settled by diplomatic intercourse, may be settled by the bureau
itself, on a single appeal of one of the powers, in two cases: (I)
When the cause of the conflict has been foreseen by a previous treaty
of arbitration. (2) When it arises from one of those foreign loans
for which General Porter's proposition has provided that they must
always be settled by arbitration.
But there is another difficulty. To whom shall the right of cita-
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tion be allowed? Shall it belong as well to subject states as to those
which are sovereign? Shall it appertain to former as well as to
existent states; to decayed nations reduced to a condition of humble
international vassalage, as well as to people who, independent and
proud, have preserved a political identity and are able to speak in
their own name? Shall it belong to Poland, to Alsace-Lorraine, to
Ireland, to the Jewish people? Shall it belong to the Pope, strug-
gling against the violation of a concordat? Shall it belong to a
negro tribe, nameless or effaced, throwing out a scarcely audible
cry of woe against an oppressing state? It is here that the politic
spirit, which prevailed in both Hague Conferences, should be tem-
pered by the spirit of equity. At first sight such questions demand
only one answer, that of non-reception. There is no solution more
seductive for all those who flatter themselves that they have some
practical sense. It needs no effort of the imagination, gives an
answer to everything and is never compromising to him who adopts
it. But a desire for analysis vexes the philosopher; a breath of love
transports the philanthropist; a sentiment of equity permeates the
jurist and finally, under this triple inspiration, a passion for justice,
capable of conquering all obstacles, takes possession of the popular
mind, which, in its turn, rules the politician. It is necessary, then,
to reflect in spite of ourselves, and we will not elude, in the end, the
imperious question, "Who are the persons of international law to
whom the power of summoning should appertain?"
Let us take immediately the side of the general disposition and
of political necessities. Since the jurisdiction of the Hague is inter-
national in character, it is evident that no question of domestic poli-
tics can be conferred upon it, and that there can be no action by Brit-
tany or Savoy against the French Government; no more, moreover,
can there be a claim by the Canton of Neufchhtel against the Swiss
Republic, or of the city of London against the king of England.
Administration problems which can be raised between different gov-
ernments and the geographical portion of their domains remain in
the exclusive jurisdiction of national tribunals. Certain though this
principle is, it remains none the less difficult, in many cases, to trace
a precise boundary between ethnographic unities which enjoy politi-
cal personality, and those which are only dependencies of another
sovereignty. The acuteness of this question is even more important
because often the people, whose autonomy is the more doubtful,
raise problems, the international character of which is most appar-
ent. It is thus that the question of Alsace-Lorraine, which has been
cited for thirty-seven years as the most troublesome type of interna-
tional questions, arises from a situation of two provinces which, in
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fact, and even in law, after the traditional theory of conquest, have
passed beneath the rule of the German Government, and whose
autonomy is not to be contended for, since even before the treaty
of Frankfort they were dependent upon the French Government, so
that their international personality is not easy to determine. Shall,
or shall not, the doctrine of the pacificator extend so far as to allow
them a right of direct citation? When it was asked if the affair of
the Transvaal could not be submitted to the Hague Tribunal, Eng-
land objected that it had to do, in her opinion, with a question of
domestic politics. This point of view was very questionable. It
was contrary, indeed, to the evidence. But, supposing that it had
been well taken, the difference arising between the metropolis and a
people which it considered as a colonial possession, would have had
none the less all the characteristics of an international litigation of
the first degree. It is necessary, then, to grasp the question very
closely in order to find a satisfactory solution.
Logic demands, first of all, one distinction. It is necessary to
understand clearly the difference between the right of citation and
the object of the citation, that is to say, the power of demanding
the jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal on the one hand and the
conditions upon which this jurisdiction may be demanded on the
other. It is, indeed, evident that a question may be and may remain
one of international order, even though it arises from the condition
of a people, a province or a principality, to which the right of cita-
tion does not appertain; and one is led by this observation to admit
that the power to cite may be denied to such and such a party injured
without making it impossible to submit its cause to the Hague Tri-
bunal whenever there arises a question of international law, how-
ever little the case was originally capable of being brought up by
another party which later has an actual interest in the outcome and
which possesses the requisite qualities to demand jurisdiction.
We see, then, that it is easy to limit strictly, without fear of any
resulting injustice, the power of citation and to admit the appli-
cation of a principle consistent with the terms of which there can
be no action except for those who constitute a physical or moral
personage, that is to say, for sovereign powers, independent and
autonomous. We can give the right of citation to tributary states
and even to states submitting to a protectorate, because, in spite of
their bonds of vassalage, their personality remains whole and their
dependency does not constitute a confederation. But one is not
able to demand the same right for parties of a constituted state nor
of ancient states actually absorbed in another state, or in a confed-
eration. Indeed, to the extent that such parties are in corrflict with
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their own governments, the question would be only a matter of
domestic politics; if they find themselves in controversy with another
state, it is not personally, but by the sole organism of their govern-
ments that their cause may be upheld. Even in the United States,
where each one of the members of the Union enjoys a domestic gov-
ernment comparatively autonomous, it is provided in the terms of
the Constitution"o that local administrations may not entertain any
relationship with a foreigner and that foreign politics are for the
exclusive administration of a federal cabinet which sits at Wash-
ington. The case was the same for the Scandinavian Federation
until its recent dissolution; and if the Norwegian Cabinet has been
able to obtain, by reason of its secession, an independence, implying
the right to cite in future, which we had formerly denied, this could
only arise at the moment when the controversy arising between
Sweden and Norway had transformed into questions of foreign
politics questions which up to that time related only to domestic
politics. The same reasoning leads us to believe equally that the
German states and the Swiss cantons respectively absorbed in the
confederations, having the power to represent them in the outer
world, would not be able to pretend to any right of citation.
Nevertheless, the admitted principle would logically carry with
it the right of citation for the Pope, who has aways enjoyed an inde-
pendent personality in the international point of view, and who re-
serves a sovereignty of a spiritual order, even though his temporal
power has been reduced to a minimum. But the right of citation
would not appertain either to the Poles nor to the Jews, who have
no longer any nationality distinct from that of the different coun-
tries of which they have become subjects, and, though it would
be to our regret, we would not be able to allow it either to the
Fins or to the Armenians, or to the people of Alsace-Lorraine.
Nothing, however, hinders its extension to those African or Asiatic
tribes who do not enjoy a personality properly speaking, because of
their insufficient political organization, but whose autonomy is not
to be questioned, and whose right and liberty, whenever menaced
by the spirit of conquest, have no other guarantee except interna-
tional law, the application of which is incumbent upon the Hague
Tribunal.
Having so fixed the boundaries of the power of citation, it
remains for us to show that all infractions of international law will
not be less justiciable 'before the Hague Tribunal, however little
they are able to be identified with an actual interest in the case by
io. Art. i, Sec. xo, of the American Constitution.
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one of the powers to which the right of citation belongs. Take the
case of Alsace-Lorraine. It is understood that this victim of annex-
ation will have no action nor any personal voice before the inter-
national court. But France will remain free, because of the impre-
scriptible character, many times proclaimed, of its claims, to intro-
duce before the Hague Tribunal, by reason of the right of citation,
which belongs to it, an action limited doubtless to its actual interest,
bat capable, nevertheless, of serving directly the sacred cause of
the provinces which have not yet ceased to suffer because of their
dismemberment. The same procedure will permit, in the same way,
the bearing of the Armenian or the Finland problems before the
Hague Tribunal; so that it is seen that if the door of the Supreme
Tribunal remains narrow, even if it is closed except for the benefit
of the nations privileged through their history, (which are too often
merely the beneficiaries of usurpation or of violence), this little
opening will, nevertheless, allow passage to all those currents of
justice of which we expect life, so that its judgment will have
penetrated elsewhere. And so the everlasting words of Gambetta
will be verified. "Great reparation can result from law."
And now will an objection of opportunism be raised? Will
there be a complaint that old questions will have a chance to be
revived just when they were thought to be covered by oblivion?
Will it be feared that in place of the wish for pacification the result
of these methods will envenom the relations of friendly or conten-
tious neighboring countries? Such apprehensions can be dispelled
only by an argument of analogy. How does it work out in internal
law? If the effect of the freedom of taking direct action is to cause
trouble between citizens, it would probably produce an analogous
inconvenience between nations as soon as they are allowed the same
privilege. If, on the contrary, it is shown that free access to the
Civil Tribunal, far from provoking contention among individuals,
gives to each citizen a feeling of security, all this indicates that it will
be the same in the international conditions. Now is it not incon-
trovertible that public peace within each country is forwarded as
a direct result of a freedom which every person possesses, to make
his appeal to social justice instead of taking justice into his own
hands? Feuds, broils, personal vengeance and strikes themselves,
show still and have always shown, the feebleness and insufficiency,
or the incompetence of the regular courts. Violence is not used
except to defend rights which no law conserves and which no insti-
tution of law protects. If questions of delicacy and honor are still
solved by outbreaks or by the sword, it is because the offended par-
ties know that their own feelings are too personal for any judge to
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appreciate them at their actual value. Professional dignity, con-
jugal faith, and pride are things of too inconstant w.eight to be
measured upon the symbolic scales. That is why combats still
occur to wash away disgrace in blood. But psychology, to which
we now make an appeal, teaches us, on the other hand, that for all
the rights which the right of citation protects, the simple fact of
being able to act gives confidence to the interested parties and dis-
suades them from all personal action. The power to demand jus-
tice rarely stimurates anyone to bring an action. Most men never
do bring an action, but all rely on the knowledge that if the neces-
sity did arise for them there would be swift and just means to pro-
tect their rights. Public security is the result of this sentiment-
reasoned out by very few people, but instinctively felt by everybody.
The right of direct action will produce manifestly the same result
among nations. They will not plead for the mere pleasure of
pleading; they will not demand before the Hague Tribunal a recast-
ing of the map of the world any more than individuals demand from
the tribunals a redivision of property. There are certain acquired
rights, the definite character of which will be admitted. That which
will be prosecuted in the court, that which will be questioned, that
which will be destroyed by the power of law, will be the evil of
flagrant acts of injustice, the oppression of liberties and of con-
science, the violation of treaties, the effusion of innocent blood, the
dismemberment of countries. And who will complain at seeing
finally struck down so much wickedness, which, up to now, at the
mouth of a battery of cannon, has impudently defied public con-
demnation?
What if, nevertheless, some frivolous question, some quarrel of
another age, some antiquated pretension, should be timorously car-
ried before the Hague Tribunal? To whom rather than to it can
it be entrusted to formulate in the language of law the sentence
of exclusion? It is made up of men who are the wisest in the world;
it is impartial and it should be sovereign. Let, then, be left to it the
case of deciding, in perfect liberty and of passing judgment in each
hypothesis, whether it is competent, whether it is rightfully applied
to, and whether the substance of the suit really exists. The confi-
dence which the judge deserves is in the last analysis the best argu-
ment in favor of the power of direct action.
Jacques Dumas,
Procureur de la Ripublique d Rethel, France.
